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ABSTRACT
The technology for lightning protection of even
the most advanced spacecraft is available and
can be applied through cost-effective hardware
designs and design-verification techniques. In
this paper, the evol.ution of the Space Shuttle
Ligh£nin s Protection Program is discussed, in-
cluding the general types of protection, test-
ing, and analyses being performed to assess the
lightning-trig, giant-derange susceptibility of Solid rocketb
solid-state electronics. _
INTltODUCTION !-n keeping with a nation.,1 co_itment to pro-
vide a lov-cost space transportation system, I
the Specs Shuttle vehicle (Pig. 1) must accommo-
date numerous launch and landing operations in ',
an adverse weather environment each year. The
advanced solid-state electronics and the unique
thermal protection system required for atmospher-
ic entry create particular lightning protection JLproblesw.
Pros pest experiences vith lightning, the most FIGURE I. SPACE SHUTTLESYSTEM.
notable of vh'ich vu the Apollo 12 lightning
strike incident I end the resulting Apollo-Soyua _:
Test Project Overall Simulated Lightning Test 2, LIGNTiIINCCOIMITTEE
NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center engineers
recognised that protection for the Spice Shut- The management approach was to assemble a group
tie vould require the application of state-of- of specialists vho would provide ms early def-
the-ere technologies. To be cost-effective, inition of the ILl, thing environment (dmeil_
protective dmsiEn measures had to be incorpo- model) and who would develop the dmsip require-




thus formed consisted of representatives from external hardware that must be located in main
: the Shuttle element contractors, the integrat- current paths or arc-attachment zones.
ing contractor, the U.S, Air Force, the three
NASA centers actively involved with the Space To determine the arc-attachment zones, a test
• Shuttle Program, and four consultants from the was conducted on a 0.03-scale model of the
engineering and scientific co---unlty. Space Shuttle vehicle (Fig. 2). The results of
this test are contained in Reference 4. Of par-
The product of this committee was the Space titular concern to the designers was the extent
Shuttle Lightning Protection Criteria Docu- of damage to the Orbiter thermal protection
merit 3, a document that is being used in the coverings, Hence, two further tests were con-
Shuttle hardware design. The committee con- ducted. The purpose of the first test was to
tinues to function to help resolve particular perform a preliminary evaluation Co determine
lightning protection design problem as they the vulnerability of the various protective ms-
arise, terlals to lightning and to determine the feasi-
billty of incorporating lightning diverter
DESIGN REQUIREMENTS strips. The results 5 led to the conclusion that
diverter strips that could withstand entry heat-
The formulation of the design requirements ing wore too heavy. Therefore, the second test
centered around two basic questions. To what was conducted to establish the extent of damage
degree or depth should protective measures be caused by a full-threat swept-stroke lightning
applied? What design limits should be imposed? strike. An analysis of the results 6 showed
chaC the area of damage produced in the latter
From a practical approach, circuit upsets would test was thermally acceptable with no special
be acceptable, if adverse actions were unlikely protection required.
to occur. Some damage would be acceptable only
if such damage did not result in loss of the we- _ 1-r;_ ,_ T],_
hicle. Several factors, such as vehicle safe- _"
ty, weight, simplicity, cost, and existing tech-
nology for protective designs influenced the
design requirements. The Shuttle specification
thus imposed specific protection requirements
in some areas while criteria and guidelines
for protection were provided in other areas.
The design requirements were divided into two ,.\:_._.i ....
categories - direct lightning effects and indi- '_.-_- •
rect lightning effects. The direct effects
were defined as burning, blasting, direct coup- _
ling of voltages and currents, and structural . ,.L
deformation caused by llghtning-arc attachment. _
Also included in this definition were the high- !_
pressure shock waves and magnetic forces caused
by the high lightning currents. The indirect
effe=ts were defined as the damage or malfunc-
tions (clrcult upsets) caused by induced cur-
rents and voltages that are produced by the
electromagnetic fields that occur with light-
ning. /Lightning protection measures are divided into
four groupsz the control of lightning paths,
isolation of sensitive circuits, unique circuit
design, and design verification. These mess- FIGURE2. LIGHTNINGARC-ATTACKMENTTEST.
urea fundamentally entail the application of
low-resistance electrical bonding and grounding, Another area of primary concern was the pyro-
circuit isolation, aperture closeouts, wire technics, which could be ignited or damaged
and cable shlelding, filtering, and special with direct lightning arc attachment. Two
circuit designs to negate the effects of light- worst-case candidates, the Orbiter outer panel
nlng-induced voltage and current transients, severance system (for crew infllght escape) and
the solid rocket booster frustrum separation
DESIGN VZRIFICATIO_ system, were tasted. The results of these
tests are given in References 7 and 8, reapec-
The capability of the hardware to withstand tively. The tests indicated that both ordnance
both the direct and indirect effects of light- system could withstand a full-threat (200 000
nin8 can be varified through analysis or test; A) lightning strike without any adverse effects.
but, in some cases, a combination of both is r
required. For the Space Shuttle, a full- Many oth-r direct effects tests were conducted
threat-level direct effects test has been on Shuttte hardware. For the interested reader,
specified for antennas, picot tubes, thermal results of the more important tests may be ob-






Various indirect effects tests were also con- Lightning transient testing at the unit -nd sub-
_ ducted, end of special note was the testing on system levels was a new experience for most
the solid rocket booster nozzle severance equipment vendors. Costs quoted for such test- :
(ordnance) system cable chat is detailed in Eel- ins were prohibitive and serious velght penal-
erence 22. In thls test, a 40 000-A lightning ties (up to 600 lb) for shielding were maces-
current was driven through the ordnance cable sary to maintain the induced-voltage levels
outer shield (triple shielded) without firing below design limits. Also, during the Apollo-
or dudding the explosives. In addltlon_ the Soyuz lightning test, induced voltages as high
pyrotechnic initiator controller that provides se 350 V were measured with no resultlp4 tempo-
the electrical signal to fire the ordnance was sent damage. In addition, studies performed
not adversely affected, for the U.S. Air Force 25 indicated that compo-
nent pulse failure powers could vary by I or 2
A method for terminating cable shields using orders of magnitude among components with the
diodes yes tested for possible Shuttle applica- same part number. Thus, qualification testing
teen and the results are discussed in Reference to determine failure levels for electrical and
23. This scheme can be used when a conflict electronic hardware proved to be impractical.
exists in electromagnetic interference and At this point, the lightning protection program
lightning-shielding requirements, for the Shuttle vehicle was redirected.
Verification that hardware is immune to the in- Space Shuttle critical avionics systems have
direct effects of lightning, however, proved to been designed to be failure tolerant; that is,
be more difficult than originally envisioned, sufficient redundancy has been used so that the
vehicle can still perform a mission after one
ANALYSIS VERSUS TEST failure in a critical system. A second failure
in that system, at worst, will still allow a
The original plan to assess the indirect el- successful return of the Orbiter. The vehicle
fects of lightning on Shuttle hardware was two- is, therefore, designed to be fail-operatio,el/
fold. First, the electromagnetic field levels fail-safe. Lightnlng-induced failures in crit-
inside the vehic!e were calculated based on a icsl avionics equipment can be tolerated, as
full-threat-level (200 000-A design model) long as the fail-safe design requirement is not
lightning strike Co the vehicle. (The details violated, i
of the analytical procedure used will be dis- t_
cussed in another paper presented at this con- LIGlf/_ING TRANSIENTDAMAGEANALYSIS l
ference.) Various unshielded circuit runs, i
using _rst-case loop areas routed .hrough The lightning transient survivability of elec- I:
these magnetic fields, were postulated and trical components and equipment can be deter- [
analyzed. From these analyses, open-circuit mined by analysis. Theoretical and experimen-
voltages and short-circuit currents were cal- tel murk by D. C. Wunech and R. R. Bell 26 has I,
culeted. The results were then discussed with shown that the power level required Co damns,
the Lightning Committee. Rased on experience a semiconductor junction is proportional to the
with indirect lightning effects on similar minus one-half power of the pulse width of the
types of equipment, the comuittne concluded applied power for pulse widths between 0.1 and i_
that the off-the_shelf avionics equipment being 100 Psec. !
proposed for the Shuttle should withstand a i
$O-V and 10-A (2-_sec) lightning transient with- PF " Kt-I/2 _
out damage. Thus, this requirement yes imposed
on all flight-critical electrical and electron- where PF " failure power, K = proportionality i
ic hardware. The electromagnetic environment constant, and t = pulse width, i
inside the vehicle vould be controlled, with at
leant • 6-dR margin, to levels below the equip- The proportionality constant has been named the
sent design levels. This lightning design con- '_unsch" or "damage" constant. In general, the
t_ol would be exercised through the use of pulse widths of lightning-induced voltage fall
shielding, aperture cloeeouts, judicious equip- within the cited range, and the Wunsch damage
meat location, and other design techniques, equation can be used directly to predict whether
avionics semiconductors viii survive lightning-
Secondly, the calculated electromagnetic field induced voltages. Based on the Apollo-Soyuz
environment would be verified by actual measure- Test Project lightning teat, a 5-_sec pulse
meat in an overall vehicle (Orbiter only) siam- width yes chosen for Shuttle systems analysis.
feted lightning test. Prediction of the elec- Damage constants of semiconductor devices were
tromagnetic _elde inside sysmetrical vehicles, calculated using the junction capacitances Cj
such as the solid rocket boJster and the exter- and breakdotm voltages Vbd, and the thermal ',
nal Cask, is well established from first prin- impedances from junction-to-ambient 8; e or :
ciples of physics! therefore, testing at the from junction-to-case Ojc , using the _quations :
vehicle level to verify ln_arnel fields wee not given in Reference 27. The damage constants can "
planned. Avionics and other critical electri- also be determined by testing, but a statisti-
cal equipment tmuld be verified at the unit, tally significant number of components (six to L
subsystemp end vehicle levels using transient nine) must be tested to failure. A vide dispar-
analysis tests similar to those described in seen (plus or minus l to 2 orders of magnitude)






with the same part number. The sisnif!_,mce of taken. This action consists of adding shields
this fact cannot be overlooked when cuntamplat- to wires, relocating equivment and wiring to
lug lightniq transient damage suscaptlbillty areas of lower magnetic fleld intensity, adding
"_ testing at the unit or subsystem level. Dmqe transient suppression de.':ct, s, or redesigning
levels can, however, be calculated to within the affected equipment. A sensitive circuit is
plus or minus I to 2 orders of m`snicuda; ends shown in Figure 3. The eqttivalant circuit and
through the use of derstinS techniques, a dsmt$e sample analysis are shown in Fisures 4 and 5.
constant can be calculated to ensure that at It is interesting to note that the most suscep- .
least 95 percent of the components will actually tlble components in the circuit shown in Figure ;
h_ve a higher damage constant. This fact, along 3 are saner diodes that were added to protect
with the multiple redundancies used in critical the rest of the circuit from transients. If j
system-, s11ows .., analytic xpproech to be taken the diodes are removed, the circuit failure '_
to assure Chats from • component damage stand- ,_
point, the vehicle vilI be able to return safely
after beln8 struck by lightning. The analytic LUI01Atechniques described in this paper are quite
sintlar to those that are currently in usa for R55
alectronasnetic p_Ise survivability analysis. J2-Z _ :,_Y,* -T_
100 o I _
Damage constants have been determined for more 5?,
than 18 000 components by the U.S. Air Force. tOO_l
These data, stored in a computer progran called -r _OOV I
SUP_SAP, were made available for the Shuttle RS6 Janalysis effort. References 25, 27, and 28 _ AJWV -
have been used for Shuttle analysls. 24.9 K
The analytic approach 1seedby the Space Shuttle 1N49_4
Program is divided into three steps, the first
L_o of vhlch are performed in parallel. First, _" "_ CR14
for each criticality I (failure of which causes 1N49S4
loss of life or vehicle) black box or component, 7
the internal circuits that are connected in
flight tare identified and detailed to the exter- FIGURE3. TYPICALCIRCUIT FOg LIGHTNING
hal connector and pin numbers. Using electro- TRANSIENTANALYSIS.
magnetic pulse analysis techniques, the damage
levels, failure voltage, and failure current are
established for each connector contact. In the • ,,.,,,v,_,_,,,,
analysis, all damage constants are derated by • --J2._
factor of 0.I, unless other data indic•re that '; c,_5 v80_ -6-ev l
the damage constant corresponds to the lower ts- 0._n , I ts_ as6 '.l 3
95-percentile failure level. A pulse width of ';_1 rye,. o._v2, 10o_ 2,._! ,'c22
!
5 _sec is used for all circuits except those that _ )vr c,:4 ----------4 _ ..... ';j
cross the Orbiter/external tank, solid rocket 's; 0.__ u_t _0o_r _;
booster/external tank, or the Shuttle vehicle/ "_1 o_, ,.
V_2 7 V VBD3ground checkout interfaces. For those interface 60v,
circuits, • pulse width of 50 to 100 _sec is uses i!','s'_ % ,_.:_! _.
because light•in8 currents can flay directly in
the overall shields of the interconnecting cables, o,,_ .
Simplifyin_ assunptioos are used whenever poe- _5o_ms,P _; s_,[m_
sable to shorten the analysis. Such assumptions, ,._ o,,_....j,
hc_ever, are always selected to provide a _r• _ : o.oo_ • _ o.o_m _ =_o
conservative answer, vto • _o v, .7 v8o ,,.s
P_ Kt "l_ Pw KI -I _ PF KI "| _ 4472V
Second, the induced open-clrcuit voltage and , -_,t0"_-_ , -_,_0",.. o...,0,_
short-circuit current for each interconnecting ,, = |._?W PF • l_.§J W PF : 447 W
_re are calculated using the re`•hod eat•b- ms - |3.zn mm - _._n ms _os
lashed in Appendix F of geference 3. If the '_3me ° _r3VSO3"Pf0 |_ ' '_ltm ' _rlv|Ol"_
calculated induced-voltage and short-circuit ,_ ::_, \
current exceed the calculated failure voltage ';_ _0.o_., _ .:.o, v, "vast' ;_'m
and current, step 3 is undertaken, v_ =veo,_r3cs v_ -vso_+,_zt| vr -IM._v
Vr • kO.)V VF v ),_._V
Third, the analysis is expanded to include
total end-to-end circuit impedances, and the _,t,,
simplifying assumptions are removed. An anal- 1'ms"*"'_v"_)wt#eeec'zs"
yeas of the total circuit then yields the volt- z _u;0_,_..mm-.._,_._._.v,w. 3_m_..._sqdw_ ?.S W _d W_,W_,e3) _v 2? W at Imm 95-mc U/e fa_u.e
ass that appears at each and of the circuit and m.,_.,_w,-w-.,_._,_,_,_,._.e._,.,,_,
a current that is limited by the total circuit
imped-'nc•. If these values exceed the fail- FIGUIU[ h. SAHPLEEQUIVALENTCXRCUXTAND
ure voltage and current, corrective action is FAZLUIUr.DATA.
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FfCR15, IF1 : 23.9A Generator .... .. --. -- --. --....-
t
! VF = V801  _1(RE+ REF) + V OtoO= 21.74 V maximum
• Far Ull Out, _2 = 1.0A Legend 1.6 X _-,0 dv
i vF= _2m55  Re)  Vso_vF: v._. _,mg.
VF : 110.7V IF = Fillwe cun_(
Fw Ul1 In, _3 = 0.026 A RB = Reversebulkresistance
R55C22 = 0.01 ,_sec ReF -_Farwtd bulk,estIRance VoJLllgef V
0.01 _ SecqOc5 _sec VBD : ReversebreakdownyMtage
th_efel, C22 canbe¢(mslderedopen
VF = IF3R56 + VB03 = "/07V
vrfo.cell,, I-.t_. vFf_,ull Op,IGIN;"_ T)J_GF'__..,.viS
' ' '
_,nd_,t_e_0, CR15,,th, OF pOOR Time,/_sec
e_lt t_:eptlbls campoe_ntjand FIGU]U_ 6, ]PH_E l TEST VOLTAGE WAVEFOPJIS,
VF : 21.7V
: IFI + )2 + 13' 13 : 0 becauseUll InputVBD< VF through the exiitin i rsdiofrequency link to
the launch processing _ystem and by onbo_rd
viauxl observation (umnned). A number of car-
+ _VF'Vs02 emits, particularly sensitive to lightnins-IF IF1
eSS+ eB induced effects, vilI be monitored by a special
fiber optics system.
IF : 24A
Im_ the second phase, the vehicle systems and
test confisuritimt vilI be the sane as for the
FIGUP.E 5. SABLE CALCULATIONS. first phase except that I test current (Fi 8. 8)
rill be passed through the vehicle and returned
through a number of vires placed sTunetrically
release mould increase from 22 V to 119 V, I around the vehicle.
|rester than ftvefold increase. However, the
failure current mould decrease from 24 A to The results of these tests mid the results of
1 A. The diode suppression, therefore, would the aforementioned analyses rill then be used
be adequate only if /mpedence in series with to evaluate the lightness protection desiBna of
the induction generator (it the other end of the vehicle.
the vire run) is _Lsh enoush to limit the
short-circuit current to less thin 24 A. CONCLUDING
OR|ITB| SXNULAllD LIGHTNING TEST Adequate lightniu8 protection can be provided
efficiently end effectually in s spacecraft by
The present plan is to conduct J simulated incorporates| veil established and relatively
lightninl test on the Shuttle Orbiter vehicle, simple practices into system designs. Proper
-, The primary objectives veil be to identify the iulyses are required to determine where and
critical circuit upsets (i.e., those that could how _o apply these practices in the design.
cause loss of the vehicle) end to verify the
predicted ltshtninE-inducnd sut_netic fields .'he costs (i.e., yeS|he and affects on systems)
vithin the vehicle. It should be noted that, tr implement a ltghtnin| protection projr-.,
elthouJh upset levels can be analytically deter- sit be closely balanced against the seine in
m/ned, the analysis mould be extremely compli- the utility of the vehicle to perform its m/s-
eated. Also, upset levels should not vary sis- seen.
niflcintly from vehicle to vehicle, so results
obteiond from teatime one vehicle should apply The indirect effects analyses and the planned
to ill vehicles. ?or the first phase, the Or- vehicle level lishtnin8 test are perhepa "break-
biter viii be isolated from |round, po_red up, in 8 _ _round"| heenver, they are practical
end system confijurnd for fltlht operations and assets/eel rays to ensure that the desiSa
below 50 000 ft. The Output of i high-volta|e vill protect critical circuits.
8eouretor, fed through s pulse-ferrules netvork,
viII be connected to the vehicle and 8 series The damqe emlyses for ell critical circuits
of voltise voveforne (?is. 6) vii1 be applied ore expected to be completed before the vehicle-
to ezctte the vehicle u on upen-onded trentiis- level test of Orbiter vehic;e 102, _hich should
eion line. ?titre ? sho_ a rudimentary test occur in early 1980. ?or this test, the 8o41
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